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Abstract
In this chapter we examine social networks among farmers in a developing country.  We use detailed
data on economic activities and social interactions between people living in four study villages in
Ghana.  It is clear that economic development in this region is being shaped by the networks of
information, capital and influence that permeate these communities.  This chapter explores the
determinants of these important economic networks.  We first describe the patterns of information,
capital, labor and land transaction connections that are apparent in these villages.  We then discuss
the interconnections between the various economic networks.  We relate the functional economic
networks to more fundamental social relationships between people in a reduced form analysis.
Finally, we propose an equilibrium model of multi-dimensional network formation that can provide
a foundation for further data collection and empirical research.
Keywords: Endogenous Networks, Informal Credit, Social Learning
JEL Codes: O12, D85II n t r o d u c t i o n
The design of economic policy in Africa has been, and continues to be, ham-
pered by dependence upon misleading units of analysis inherited from ven-
erable models that were developed in a radically diﬀerent social context. We
think about ‘ﬁrms’ that produce, interacting through markets with ‘house-
holds’ that consume, and about small enterprises in which the roles of the
‘household’ and the ‘ﬁrm’ are merged. It is increasingly clear, however, that
the very deﬁnition of the core units of the ‘household’ and ‘ﬁrm’ are problem-
atic in many African contexts and that the facile use of these concepts can
lead to misleading judgments about the process of economic development.
In Africa, the boundaries of ‘household,’ ‘ﬁrm’ and ‘market’ are mobile
and permeable. Things resembling market transactions occur within house-
holds and family-like interactions take place across households and ﬁrms.
Rather than conceptualizing membership in a household or ﬁrm as a zero-
one event, it is fruitful to think of individuals as participating in numerous
social relationships of varying qualities and intensities with a variety of dif-
ferent people. Important insights about the structure of African economies
and the design of appropriate economic policy are gained by the recognition
that people are embedded within social networks.
Some of these implications are apparent in the Eastern Region of Ghana.
The region is one of the key foci of Ghana’s development strategy of expand-
ing non-traditional exports. It is experiencing a transformation of its farm-
ing system from the production of local foodstuﬀs to intensive cultivation
of pineapple for export as fresh fruit to Europe. The salient aspects of this
transformation include learning about a set of new technologies, alterna-
tions in established patterns of land resource management, a dramatic shift
to more capital-intensive production and important new risks. On each of
these dimensions, patterns of change have been fundamentally conditioned
by the composition of social networks.
For example, in Conley and Udry (2001, 2003), we ﬁnd that information
about the proper use of the new technology passes informally between farm-
ers. Farmers experiment with varying levels of input intensity (particularly
fertilizer) and they discuss the results of their experiments with a restricted
set of peers. Farmers learn from these discussions. Our data show, for ex-
ample, that a given farmer will begin to use more fertilizer after a neighbor
with whom he is linked in an information network uses high amounts of fer-
tilizer and achieves surprisingly high proﬁts. As a consequence, people who
are strongly connected with many other pineapple farmers (call them cen-
tral) have learned the contours of this radically new technology more rapidly
1than others. We hypothesize that, in turn, other farmers value information
connections with these central farmers because of the value of the knowledge
that central farmers have obtained from others. The particular structure of
the information network in these villages has had a dramatic eﬀect on the
diﬀusion of these new techniques.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that access to land is secured via informal channels
of political power. Plots in Ghana, as in much of Africa, are controlled by
individuals, not households. Goldstein and Udry (2004) show that proﬁts
on women’s farms are much lower than those of their husbands. In these
villages, land fertility is maintained by periodic fallowing, and we show that
the reason for the much lower proﬁts on wives’ plots is the fact that they
are left fallow for shorter periods than are the plots of their husbands. This,
in turn, is a consequence of the fact that the ties of mutual obligation and
political inﬂuence that undergird land tenure security — and thus permit
extended fallow periods for men — largely bypass their wives. In southern
Ghana, access to land is based on negotiation, status and identity within
a corporate group. Those with relatively weak ties to the group leadership
are reluctant to fallow their land for fear of ﬁnding it reallocated to a rival
when it is time to re-establish cultivation. Women are disproportionately
likely to inhabit the margins of this political network and so fallow relatively
little. What is particularly striking about our ﬁndings is the extent to which
the “household” is inconsequential for cultivation decisions. The political
inﬂuence of the husband seems to be entirely irrelevant for the security of
tenure of the wife. It is in those households in which the husband holds
a political oﬃce and the wife does not that the gap in fallowing (and thus
fertility and proﬁts) between the husband’s plots and the wife’s plots is
largest.
Political inﬂuence and thus security of access to land ﬂows through net-
works that cleave households. Similarly, husbands and wives tend to par-
ticipate in separate insurance networks. Goldstein (2002) shows that risk-
sharing between husbands and wives is highly imperfect. Women pool risk
with other women in their villages more than with their husbands, and
men share risk with male members of their extended families. Other ﬁnan-
cial ﬂows show a similar pattern. Rates of return on capital invested in this
export-led rural economy are astonishingly high (Goldstein and Udry 1999a).
However, net ﬁnancial inﬂows are small and largely follow well-established
paths between individuals with deep social connections: sometimes between
husband and wife, but more often between siblings, long-term friends and
members of the extended family. It is clear that credit constraints apply at
the level of the individual, not the “household”: there were numerous in-
2stances during our ﬁeldwork in which a wife was unable to make potentially
proﬁtable investments (say, in pineapple cultivation or a non-farm enter-
prise) as the husband was expanding his on-going enterprise. Once again, it
is the individual’s position in the relevant social network that is the crucial
determinant of access to a valued resource.
Our work thus far has made it clear that economic development in this
region is being shaped by the networks of information, capital and inﬂu-
ence that permeate these communities. The ﬁrst goal of this chapter is to
describe the patterns of information, capital, labor and land transaction
connections that are apparent in these villages. We discuss the intercon-
nections between the various economic networks: how closely related are
the functionally diﬀerent connections between individuals? We then relate
these functional connections between individuals to more fundamental spa-
tial, kinship, migration, gender and religious relationships between people.
Finally, we propose an equilibrium model of multi-dimensional network for-
mation that can provide a foundation for further empirical research. Our
hope is that this chapter can serve as a resource for future data collection
on social networks guided by economic theory.
II Data and Setting
The research was conducted in four clusters of villages in the Eastern Region
of Ghana. Commercial agriculture is no recent innovation in the study area.
Historically, the farming systems of the study area have undergone a series
of signiﬁcant changes. In the 19th century, oil palm production sparked
the ﬁrst inﬂow of migration to the area. This district was at the heart of
Ghana’s cocoa revolution at the turn of the 20th century (Hill 1963). In 1930,
swollen shoot disease devastated cocoa production and farmers adopted a
system based on intercropped cassava and maize. Most recently (since the
early 1990s), farmers in the area have moved towards intensive pineapple
production for export.
The southern Ghanaian forest-savanna transition zone has seen a
dramatic reduction in forest cover since the 1970s (as evidenced by aerial
photography (Gyasi et al 1994) and satellite imagery (Hawthorne and Abu-
Juam 1995), important reductions in fallow lengths over the same period
(Gyasi et al 1994, Amanor 1994) and increased evidence of soil deterioration
and infestation by pests, particularly the virulent weed known locally as
akyeampong) (Gyasi 1990; Amanor 1994). Land rights, however, have
not been transformed into anything close to individualized freehold tenure.
3Berry (2001) notes that land in southern Ghana “is subject to multiple,
overlapping claims and ongoing debate over these claims’ legitimacy and
their implications for land use and the distribution of revenue” (2001, p.
xxi). Goldstein and Udry (2004) provide evidence that fallowing decisions
are strongly inﬂuenced by the cultivator’s political position in the village
and lineage.
Within each village cluster we selected 60 married couples (or triples - a
b i tm o r et h a nﬁve percent of husbands have multiple wives) for our sample.
Each member of the pair or triple was interviewed 15 times during the course
of the two years. Every interview was carried out in private, usually by an
enumerator of the same gender.
The survey was centered around a core group of agricultural activity
questionnaires (plot activities, harvests, sales, credit) that were administered
during each visit. In addition, about 35 other modules were administered
on a rotating basis. We also administered (once per ﬁeld) an in-depth plot
rights and history questionnaire and mapped each plot using a geographical
information system. We supplemented this with data on soil fertility: the
organic matter and pH of each plot was tested each year.
Much of the analysis of this paper is based on data we collected on the
social and economic interactions of our sample members with other people,
and in particular with other people in our sample. We recorded data on
the contacts that each of our respondents had with other individuals (in the
data archive, this is the “individual roster”). ‘Contacts’ include learning
interactions, credit and gift transactions, sales/purchases of farm inputs and
outputs and labor and land market interactions. In the second year of the
survey, for each such transaction we asked the respondent to provide certain
information about the other party to the transaction. Data was recorded on
the relationship and frequency of contact between the respondent and the
contact, the residence and occupation of the contact and the identiﬁcation
number of the contact if he/she is in the sample. Every contact has a
unique identiﬁcation number so we can trace them throughout the diﬀerent
questionnaires.
These contacts are reasonably well-deﬁned for credit, gift, purchase/sale,
land and labor transactions. However, the nature of learning interactions is
more subtle and subjective. We asked a long series of questions about spe-
ciﬁc tasks, ideas and decisions. For example, “Did anyone advise you which
particular crops to plant on your farm?”, or “From whom did you ﬁrst learn
about the idea of using fertilizer?” Our list of information links for any indi-
vidual includes anyone named in response to these questions. In principle,
all pairs of respondents who learned about farming from each other should
4be listed. In fact, it is impossible to record the names of all individuals
with whom respondents discuss farming, so enumerators were instructed to
request the names of individuals with whom more than casual conversations
took place. Two important issues arise as a consequence. First, diﬀerent
respondents interpret ‘casual’ diﬀerently, and second, important information
might be transmitted during quite casual conversation.
Therefore, we also collected complementary data on information inter-
actions from questions about randomly selected pairs of respondents. We
collected two such datasets. One was focused particularly on learning about
pineapple. The other was more general. Consider the latter. Each sample
respondent was questioned about a random sample (without replacement)
of seven other individuals in the same village, and with three other pre-
determined individuals who appear to be focal in the village. Links for
each respondent are deﬁned according to his responses to speciﬁc questions
about the relationship with the selected persons. For example, “Have you
ever gone to ___ for advice about your farm?” For each pair of individu-
als we also record information on the frequency of contact, the period over
which they have interacted and information on familial relations. This type
of data has proven particularly useful for understanding the process of social
learning through network connections. It is less useful for understanding
the overall shape of social networks in the villages because it provides no
information on interactions between individuals outside the random sample
of seven for each respondent. Therefore, for the remainder of the chapter
we utilize data from the ‘individual rosters’ of each of the respondents.
In addition to the data on social and economic interactions, we will make
use of data on each respondent’s family background, wealth and education.
Finally, we rely on our data on the spatial relationships between the plots
of our respondents derived from the village and plot maps.
III Networks of Information, Finance, Land and
L a b o ri nS o u t h e r nG h a n a
The data on network links provides us with a random sample from which
we can infer some characteristics of the social and economic networks in
our research villages. The data are ‘egocentric’ in the parlance of network
theory: we know (in principle) about the links from our sample individuals
to other people. If one of these links happens to be to another individual
in our sample then we know a great deal about both nodes of that link, and
about further connections along the network. However, if the individual at
5the other end of the link is not a member of our sample, then our information
is quite limited. In particular, we know nothing about further links along
the network.
A simple consequence of our ﬁxed sample size across villages is that the
probability that both nodes of a given link are included in our sample is
lower in a large village than in a small village. This fact does not hinder
inference about the relative densities of networks across villages. Let Lt
v be
the number of links of type t in village v. The density of the t network in
v is deﬁned as
∆t
v =
2Lt
v
nv(nv − 1)
(1)
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). Clearly, ∆t
v ranges from 0 to 1 (for a complete
network in which each individual is connected to each other individual).
Consider two villages v and u with ∆t
v = ∆t
u. However, the sizes of the
villages could diﬀer (nv 6= nu). Since the densities are equal,
Lt
v =
nv(nv − 1)
nu(nu − 1)
Lt
u. (2)
Al i n ki so b s e r v e di no u rd a t ai fboth involved individuals are in our sample.
Therefore, if S is the ﬁxed sample size across villages, the probability of
observing any given link in village v is
³
S
nv
´2
. The expected number of
links observed in village v is
µ
S
nv
¶2
Lt
v =
µ
S
nv
¶2 nv(nv − 1)
nu(nu − 1)
Lt
u ≈
µ
S
nu
¶2
Lt
u (3)
(for large nu,n v), which is the expected number of links observed in village
u.
Our sampling was based on villages, and hence captures links only if both
individuals reside in the village. It is commonly assumed that the village
is the natural domain for the analysis of social and economic networks in
rural West Africa, but that need not be true in all places and for all types
of social network. These villages, in particular, have long been tightly
integrated into the regional, national and global economy. An analysis of
connections entirely within the village may be profoundly misleading if the
most important interactions generally cross village boundaries.
The data permit us to identify the relative extent of interactions within
and across village boundaries by network type. For most of the interactions
we consider the majority of activity occurs within the village. Most of
6the individuals named by our respondents as sources of information about
farming reside within the village. 66% of the recorded cases of learning
activity occurred with other people in the village. This proportion varies
across villages, from a low of 53% in the smallest village to between 70%
and 80% in the remaining three villages.
Financial interactions are similarly concentrated within villages. 59%
of credit transactions and gift exchanges occur within village boundaries;
virtually all the rest with relatives and friends outside the village. Only
13 of 719 loans were taken from formal or semi-formal sources. Again, the
proportion rises with village size, from 54% in the smallest village to 65%
in the largest. 62% of the individuals from whom our respondents obtained
land reside within the same village. This proportion ranges from 47% in
the smallest village to 74%.
Labor transactions appear to be even more concentrated within villages.
76% of identiﬁed non-household labor used on sample plots comes from
within the village. However, this is likely to be an overestimate of the
degree of concentration, because 40% of non-family labor is identiﬁed in our
data simply as anonymous “no relation.” For these transactions, we do not
record the residence of the laborers, so we do not know if they originate
from the village. Informal discussions and observation during the ﬁeld
research make it apparent that a substantial proportion of this kind of labor
is brought in as daily wage labor from nearby towns. Moreover, most
within-village labor transactions occur when a household head or spouse
hires dependents in other households. When this is the case, we do not have
information on the household identiﬁer of the hired worker, so the link can
not be included in much of the analysis that follows.
In dramatic contrast, only 7.6% of sales of farm output occur between
residents of the village. Virtually all output is sold directly in regional
markets, to itinerant traders or, in the case of pineapple, to specialized
commercial exporters.
The predominance of intravillage interactions for information transfer,
ﬁnancial ﬂows and land exchange makes salient the analysis of their village-
level networks. We are less conﬁdent of the importance of the within-village
labor network and place less emphasis on this network. Within-village sales
of output/purchases of farm inputs are unimportant. Therefore, we do not
examine further the shape or determinants of this network.
All of the networks that we consider are sparse in terms of direct con-
nections. Less than 2% of pairs of respondents are connected by any sort
of direct link (this corresponds to a network density of approximately .04).
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the frequency of the diﬀerent kinds
7of links by village. In each case, the denominator of the proportion is the
number of pairs of individuals in our sample in each village and the nu-
merator is the number of observed links of a given type between sample
individuals. There are few strong diﬀerences across villages in the density
of the individual functional networks. Village 2 has a noticeably sparse net-
work of labor connections, while the network of land transactions in village
3 is particularly dense.
There is a strong spatial element to these networks, and it is useful to
be able to visualize their shape in real space (Faust et al 1999). Figures 1
through 4 plot the geographic location and the various network links between
our sample individuals. The geographic location of each individual is deﬁned
by the average position of the plots (s)he cultivates and is indicated by a
node of the graph. Links between sample individuals in the various networks
are indicated by the edges of the graphs.
There are individuals in each village for each network who appear iso-
lated in these graphs. That appearance is a misleading consequence of the
strategy of constructing these graphs based on ‘ego-centric’ data from a ran-
dom sample of the population. In fact, for each of these functional networks
there is virtually no one in any of these villages who has no interactions with
anyone. Virtually everyone in our sample has learning contacts, exchanges
credit and/or gifts, hires labor and has obtained land from someone. If none
of those other parties happens to be in our sample, the individual appears
isolated in the graphs.
The graphs do point in certain interesting directions. First, there is a
substantial, but by no means complete, overlap between the diﬀerent net-
works in a given village. Individuals connected along one dimension appear
more likely to be connected along the others. This impression is strongly
supported by the statistical evidence that follows. Second, information net-
works appear to be more characterized than the other networks by the pres-
ence of focal individuals, who have multiple links in our sample. Third, it is
apparent that connections are more likely between nearby farmers, but that
links between more distant individuals are common, particularly for credit
networks.
Links between individuals in the diﬀerent functional networks are by no
means independent. Tables 2 A − F show that the presence of any kind of
link between two individuals is much more likely conditional on the existence
of any other kind of link. Credit and information links are the most closely
associated: nearly half of the pairs connected by an information link are
also connected by a ﬂow of credit or gifts, compared to an unconditional
probability of 1.25% for the existence of a credit link. The same general
8pattern, however, holds for all pairs of networks.
Careful analysis is required, therefore, to distinguish the consequences for
behavior or outcomes of diﬀerent kinds of connections between individuals.
A ﬁnding, for example, that adoption of a new technology is particularly
likely for an individual who shares an information connection with someone
who has recently had success with that technology might be attributed to
social learning eﬀects. However, because information links are correlated
with ﬁnancial links, this same observation might arise if credit markets are
imperfect and the success of the ﬁrst farmer lowered the cost of capital to
the second. Appropriate attention to the entire set of relevant networks
m a ym a k ei tp o s s i b l et od i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e nt h ed i ﬀerent kinds of social
interaction eﬀects that inﬂuence behavior.
Alternatively, it might be appropriate to think of a single network of
basic connections between individuals that can be mobilized for multiple
purposes depending upon circumstances. Over some period, a connection
might yield ﬂows of ﬁnance; at others it might involve a land transaction.
Recall how our data on links are constructed: the credit, land and labor
links are based on the existence of an exchange over the relevant period.
Information links are deﬁned somewhat diﬀerently because they look back
at the whole history of learning interactions over a respondent’s farming
career. We believe that these are better-deﬁned measures than some loose
notion of “who could you approach for credit,” land or labor. However, it
obviously has its costs because it provides no direct information about the
potential (rather than realized) uses of a given tie between individuals.
Finally, close correlation between links of various types raises the possi-
bility that the underlying determinants of network connections are similar
for diﬀerent types of links. If the diﬀerent functional links really do have
diﬀerent purposes, this pattern tends to focus our attention on the costs
of constructing and maintaining connections, which could well be similar
for diﬀerent types of links. We turn now, therefore, to an examination of
the correlations between current ties in the various networks and a set of
arguably deeper social connections between farmers.
IV Predicting Networks
Table 3 provides summary statistics about the social connections between
(non-married) pairs of individuals in the villages. The sample is the set of
all within-village pairs of sample individuals, except for pairs linked by mar-
9riage.1 Approximately one-ﬁfth of pairs are members of the same religion.
Again, one-ﬁfth of pairs are members of the same extended matrilineage
(each village has two to three matrilineages that account for a collective
70 − 80% of the population, and ﬁve or six other, smaller matrilineages).
For a further ﬁfth of the sample pairings, at least one individual in the pair
holds a traditional village or lineage oﬃce (for example, is village elder).
The two individuals have the same soil type (described as one of three ma-
jor groups of soil types) in a third of the pairings. The average absolute
value of the age diﬀerence between the paired individuals is a decade, while
the average absolute nonland wealth diﬀerence is 750,000 cedis2 (compared
to average wealth of 670,000 cedis). The average distance between the plots
of pairs of individuals is about 11
4 kilometers.
Logit estimates of the probabilities that a link exists in a pair are pre-
sented for each of the four networks (information, credit, land and labor) in
Table 4.3 Let lt
ij =1be an indicator variable that there is a link of type
t between individual i and individual j. Let the notation Pr{lt
ij =1 } refer
to the probability that lt
ij =1conditional on observable (to the econometri-
cian) information. We estimate
Pr{lt
ij =1 } = Λ(Xijβ), (4)
where Λ is the logistic CDF. Coeﬃcients are presented as odds ratios (eβk),
along with z-statistics for the test against the null hypothesis that the odds
ratio is unity. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent.
The covariates and samples are identical across the diﬀerent regressions,
and the predicted probabilities of a link in the middle of the distribution of
the covariates is very similar (always near 1−2%), so direct comparisons of
the odds ratios are sensible.
In each case, gender is a crucial determinant of the likelihood of a link
between individuals. It is very rare for non-married individuals of opposite
genders to interact directly in any of these four dimensions. It is also the case
that membership in the same matrilineage is strongly associated with the
existence of any of these network links. This is particularly so in the case of
credit links, and relatively less so in the case of information and land links.
Given the informal enforcement mechanisms that can be brought to bear
within the matrilineage, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that credit and mutual
1M a r r i e dp a i r sa r ee x c l u d e df r o mt h ea n a l y s i ss a m p l e si nT a b l e s4a n d5a sw e l l .
2The exchange rate during the survey period ranged from 1700 to 2300 cedis per US
dollar.
3See Anderson et al (1999) for a discussion of logit models in network analysis.
10gift exchanges are more common within lineages (Klingelhofer 1972). More
surprising is the ﬁnding that among the four networks, land transactions
are least positively aﬀected by membership in the same lineage. Land
rights in southern Ghana are very strongly associated with the matrilineage
(Goldstein and Udry 1999b, Berry 2001). It is possible that the relatively
small increment to the likelihood of a land link associated with membership
in the same matrilineage reﬂects the potential ambiguities of plot rights
when land is transferred within the matrilineage. “The process of acquiring
and defending rights in land is inherently a political process based on power
relations among members of the social group” (Bassett and Crummey 1993,
p. 20); the transaction may be less problematic when made on a more
commercial basis across lineage boundaries.
The ﬁnding that membership in the same church is strongly associated
with the presence of a credit link again may reﬂect the informal enforce-
ment mechanisms that are available within religious groups. Religion is not
strongly associated with the likelihood of any other type of network connec-
tion. Similarly, we ﬁnd that credit links are much more likely when both
individuals share a family origin in the same region of Ghana. Region of ori-
gin can cross-cut matrilineages in these villages, so this may reﬂect the social
enforcement mechanisms available to communities formed of migrants.
Farmers who share similar soil characteristics are much more likely to
share an information link than otherwise. This is naturally related to the
potential gains from the information link, if optimal farming practices are
variable across soil types in a non-systematic (or at least non-obvious) man-
ner. We also ﬁnd that land links are much more likely across farmers who
share soil types; the simultaneity of this relationship makes even tentative
interpretations problematic. In column 5 of Table 4 we remove this covari-
ate and distance, which is subject to the same worry, and show that the
remaining odds ratios are generally stable.
Diﬀerences in wealth are very strongly associated with the presence of
information connections. Looking more closely at the individuals in the
network maps of Figure 1 we ﬁnd that several of the apparently nodal in-
dividuals are much wealthier than average, and they tend to be connected
to individuals who are relatively less wealthy. There appears to be a sur-
prising element of hierarchy in the information network. This is otherwise
apparent only in the land network, where it is to be expected. Credit and
gift exchange, on the other hand, appears to be more horizontally oriented.
These exchanges do not often occur between rich and poor. The hypothesis
that the provision of insurance is an important element of credit and gift
exchange is consistent with this pattern.
11Information and land links are much less likely between individuals who
are members of the ﬁrst generations of their families to reside in the village.
For land links this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong that there are no instances of
such links in our data.
All of these network interactions are more likely between farmers who
are located near each other. One would expect the cost of social interactions
to rise with distance, hence this is a pattern to be expected. In fact, it is
this general pattern that underlies the decision by many researchers to use
geographic location as a proxy for social connections. The relationship be-
tween proximity and the likelihood of a network linkage is suﬃciently strong
that location may indeed be a reasonable proxy for network membership
for certain applications. However, it is clearly not an exact relationship,
and the impact of distance on the likelihood of interaction varies in an in-
teresting way across the networks. In particular, distance has a much less
strong negative impact on the likelihood of a credit tie than on any of the
other network connections. We have shown in other work that there is a
strong positive spatial correlation in agricultural shocks (Conley and Udry
2003, Goldstein and Udry 2004). This ﬁnding, therefore, points again to
an important insurance motivation for the credit and gift exchanges.
Deeper social connections between individuals are strongly associated
the presence of connections in these four social networks. It is possible that
information about these deeper relationships between people for predicting
network connections is less useful for predicting relatively transitory con-
nections. Unfortunately, our data is constructed in such a way that we can
examine only one side of this question. We have no information regard-
ing lapsed ties in these social networks. If two individuals once shared a
connection and no longer do, this connection will not appear in our data.
However, we do know for how long two individuals who do share a con-
nection have interacted.4 The ﬁnal two rows of Table 4 show that the
probability of correctly predicting a link to exist when the two individuals
have known each other for less than 5 years is lower than when the two
have been acquainted for longer periods. This pattern is less evident for
credit links, but is quite strong for each of the other types of connections.
While the more fundamental social relations between people are important
predictors of the likelihood of functional network connections, they are less
useful in distinguishing more recent connections and will also be less useful
4The precise question is “How long have you known ____?” This is not necessarily
the same as knowing the length of time the two individuals have shared this particular
interaction.
12to distinguish transitory links more generally.
IV.1 Robustness
The simple logit estimates presented in Table 4 leave open the possibility
that there are unobserved characteristics of individuals that inﬂuence the
probability that they are linked with others. Put simply, it is plausible
that certain individuals are more likely to build connections in a network
than others. Consequently, we explore the possibility that the appropriate
probability model takes the form
Pr{lt
ij =1 } = Λ(Xijβ + λi + λj), (5)
where λi and λj are unobserved individual ﬁxed eﬀects. This model is ob-
viously strongly related to the conditional logit model (Chamberlain 1980)
but the standard conditioning approach is not available when there are two
dimensions of ﬁxed eﬀects. Instead, we adopt a maximum likelihood ap-
proach to estimate β and λi.W h e n t h e r e i s a ﬁxed number of observations
per individual the conventional ML estimator of β is inconsistent. However,
the median number of pairs including any individual in our data is 114, so
we rely on the asymptotic consistency of the ML estimator. Estimates of
equation 5 are presented in Table 5.
This estimation strategy implies that any individual who has no link
of a particular type (that is, any i such that lt
ij =0∀j) contributes no
information to the estimate of ˆ β. Such individuals and all of the pairs of
which (s)he is a part are dropped from the estimation sample. The precise
numbers are reported in Table 5. In addition, the variable “at least one of
pair holds oﬃce” is colinear with the individual eﬀects and is dropped.
The remarkable feature of Table 5 is the overall similarity of the results
to those reported in Table 4. The strong eﬀect of gender is equally apparent
in the Table. Also, distance between plots is once again strongly negatively
associated with the likelihood of a linkage in any of these dimensions. Once
again, however, this eﬀect is much less strong for credit links than for any of
the other types of connections between individuals. As in Table 4,t h e r ei s
a very strong positive association between two individuals sharing the same
soil type and the existence of an information link between them.
The strong positive relationship observed in Table 4 between the absolute
value of the wealth diﬀerence between individuals and the likelihood that
they share an information link is not replicated in Table 5.T h e r e s u l t i n
Table 4 appears to reﬂect the fact that certain quite wealthy individuals are
13focal in the information network. Once this ﬁxed eﬀect is taken out, the
wealth diﬀerence is negatively related to the likelihood of a linkage.
The very strong positive eﬀect of membership in the same matrilineage
for the likelihood of a credit link that we observed in Table 4 is not as
apparent in Table 5. Instead, there is a much stronger eﬀect of being a
member of the same religion.
V Modeling Social Networks
The long term goal of this research program is an enriched understanding
of individuals’ behavior in the context of multiple and overlapping social
networks and, in particular, to acknowledge the agency of the individuals
embedded in social networks. The constituent links of the networks are
chosen. They confer beneﬁts, imply responsibility and require eﬀort to cre-
ate and maintain. The choice to invest in social connections within and
across conventional household boundaries is not so much a simple process
of accumulation as of developing an appropriately complementary set of ties
— ‘composition’ is Belinga and Guyer’s felicitous term (Belinga and Guyer
1995). While the shape of the networks moulds the pattern of economic
development, economic change alters the value of particular network links
and thus the shape of the networks themselves. Our goal is to understand
this dynamic of network formation.
The reduced form analyses of the previous section provide clues as to the
motivations that might be driving individuals’ decisions as they compose a
set of network connections. The results are consistent with the notion, for
example, that people are willing to pay a higher price for longer-distance
credit connections than they are for information connections. However,
in the absence of a model that incorporates both individuals’ motivations
for shaping the eventual structure of a particular social network and an
appropriate equilibrium concept, these hints must remain just hints.
There is a large and useful literature that examines network eﬃciency,
with the goal of characterizing the network conﬁguration that maximizes a
value function (Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Hendricks et al 1995; Econo-
mides 1996). This is appropriate for a planner (such as a telecommuni-
cations monopoly), but not for the decentralized process that governs the
formation of social networks like those in the sample villages. Instead, we
focus on the incentives of the individuals who build the links of the net-
work (Granovetter 1973, 1992; Coleman 1966; Fafchamps and Minten 1999;
Fafchamps 1999).
14Consider for now just two networks: the network for information and
that for credit/gift exchange. The links in these networks are bidirectional:
if i and j converse about farming, then information ﬂows in both directions.
This is less obviously true of credit links, but to the extent that insurance
motivations are central to these transactions, a bidirectional characterization
is appropriate. Of course, this does not imply that the value of the link is
identical to i and j. Bala and Goyal (1999) model the situation in which lt
ij
is costless to j, while in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) both parties bear the
cost and either can sever the link. It is not entirely clear what approximation
is appropriate in these villages. In fact, costs are borne by both parities.
But they are also asymmetric; the individual who approaches the other is
likely to bear a larger proportion of the cost.
Let N = {1,2,...n} be the set of agents in the village. Agent i0s strategy
is a vector li = {lI
i,1,lI
i,2,...lI
i,n,lC
i,1,l C
i,2,...lC
i,n} where lt
i,j =1if i forms a type
t link with j. Let the payoﬀ to i for a direct connection of type t to j be
V t
ij. This represents the value to i of the information exchange or insurance
contract between i and j.5 V t
ij varies across ij pairs.
The literature assumes exponential network decay (parameterized by δ),
so that an indirect connection between i and j provides less value than a
direct connection. The appropriate model for network decay would likely be
very diﬀerent depending upon the speciﬁc context and the type of network.
Information, for example, might be garbled when transferred between peo-
ple, in which case exponential decay could be a natural assumption. The
value of an indirect link in a ﬁnancial network might be very diﬀerent, how-
ever, depending upon the nature of the bilateral exchanges. At one extreme,
there might be no decay so that everyone in a connected network shares com-
plete insurance. One intermediate case would involve a limited commitment
model, which might involve complete insurance for small shocks and incom-
plete insurance for larger shocks (Ligon 1998). It is clear that even if the
decay in the value of indirect connections in a ﬁnancial network can be ap-
proximated by an exponential process, δ would vary according to the type
of network. We omit that notation for simplicity.
In a given network g, if the shortest path of type t between i and j is
d,t h ev a l u et oi is V t
ijδd. T h ec o s to ff o r m i n gl i n k s(lI
ij,lC
ij) is cij(lI
ij,lC
ij),
5Obviously, in general, V
t
ij depends upon the entire network conﬁguration. In virtually
any learning model, the value of an additional bit of information declines as the volume of
information increases. The situation is even more complex with respect to credit, in which
V
C
ij will depend upon the covariance of j
0s income with everyone else connected directly
or indirectly with i. We assume that these eﬀects are small so that we can approximate
the value of the connection in this linear fashion.
15where 0 <c ij(0,1),c ij(1,0) ≤ cij(1,1) <c ij(0,1) + cij(1,0).T h e v a l u e o f
an e t w o r kg in which N(i;g) is the set of individuals with direct or indirect
connections of any type to i in g is
Πi(g)=
X
j∈N(i;g)
n
V I
ijδd(i,j;I,g) + V C
ij δd(i,j;C,g) − cij(lI
ij,lC
ij)
o
(6)
The obvious Nash equilibrium of this network formation game implies a
series of inequality constraints that must hold. Let g−ijt denote network g
without a type t link between i and j,a n dg+ijt denote the same network
with the addition of this link. If lt
ij =1 ,t h e n
Πi(g) > Πi(g−ijt)
Πj(g) > Πj(g−ijt),
while if lt
ij =0then obviously enough
Πi(g) < Πi(g−ijt)
Πj(g) < Πj(g−ijt).
Heterogeneity in the characteristics of individuals (and their deeper social
relationships to one another) can be introduced. Let V t
ij = V t(xi,x j,ε ij)
and cij = c(lI
ij,lC
ij;zi,z j,υij)
Bala and Goyal (1999) provide a characterization of the equilibria of a
related model. The network in a village will be connected, and in the sym-
metric case (V t
ij = V t and cij = c(lI
ij,l C
ij)) there are many Nash equilibria.
This immediately raises very important questions about the feasibility of
estimation (Jovanovic 1989). The problem is less severe in our applica-
tion: since V and c vary across pairs of individuals in our model, the set
of equilibria is made smaller. Nevertheless, it should not be expected that
there would be a unique Nash equilibrium of this game, which complicates
estimation of the parameters of V t
ij and cij (Tamer 1999).
The most important intuition of this model for empirical work on network
formation is that the expected beneﬁtt oi of a link with j depends upon
i’s opinion about the links that j has. Hence, i is more likely to pay the
cost of linking to j if he thinks that j is linked to many people relevant to
i.I fj has characteristics (such as a common extended family or a common
church) which make it likely that he will have links with individuals whose
experience is valuable to i (with people who have plots similar to i for an
information link, for example), then i is more likely to pay for a link with j.
The costs of a link between j and, say, k depend on the interaction between
16aspects of their social backgrounds. Hence, i’s prediction of the network
resources available to j (and thus V t
ij) need not be collinear with the costs
of forming the link with j.
This model can in principle be estimated. However, the obstacles to be
overcome are daunting. The amount of independent information available
across individuals within a given network is limited because of the interde-
pendence of each individual’s actions. Data may be required on a large
number of networks in order to distinguish the diﬀerent equilibria that exist
in the diﬀerent villages (Conley and Topa 2003). The need for a broad
cross-section of data is in tension with the simultaneous need for rather in-
tensive collection of data from each individual, as described below. We
believe that the more promising direction is to study the dynamics of the
networks directly, by observing changes in the composition of individuals’
network ties. The problem then becomes one of understanding the change
in li conditional on the current existence of a particular equilibrium network
g. It remains the case that plausible sources of exogenous variation in cij
or V t
ij are required in order to interpret any observed changes in the set of
network links in the village. However, this appears to be the most promising
strategy and it has important implications for the design of data collection.
VI Lessons for future research
We have argued that patterns of economic change in rural Africa are be-
ing shaped by the conﬁgurations of social networks in these communities.
In turn, individuals’ incentives to make and break network connections are
inﬂuenced by economic transformation. The process through which indi-
viduals compose their various network connections, and the implications of
these connections for economic and social activities is an important fron-
tier for empirical research. The data that are generated by conventional
surveys, however, are not well-suited for this task.
Equation 6 makes explicit the importance of a complete enumeration of
any given social network within a community. It is not possible to calculate
the value of the network — or of any of its constituent links — in its absence.
Therefore, if an analysis of the dynamics of social networks is a goal of
the research the basic strategy of ego-centric analysis based on a random
sample is not appropriate. If the village is suﬃciently closed to make it
the relevant domain of the network, then a complete enumeration of the
network connections will be required to make progress on understanding
the determinants of network formation. This is a costly decision to make
17in planning data collection, because for most other purposes a complete
enumeration would not be the optimal sampling strategy.
Data on the creation and dissolution of network connections is particu-
larly useful to overcome some of the central technical challenges of analyzing
the determinants of the shape of social networks. Therefore, collection of
panel data might be an appropriate strategy. Alternatively, it might be pos-
sible to collect retrospective data on the history of each individual’s links to
other individuals in the community.
The potential usefulness of retrospective data on network links is limited
by the need for variation in the returns to or costs of links between individ-
uals that are driving the changes in the composition of people’s networks.
Data on network connections has to be integrated with more conventional
socioeconomic data to begin to understand the implications of the network
for behavior and outcomes, and thus to model the incentives individuals face
for link formation and dissolution. It is not generally possible to collect ret-
rospectively such data.
It is clear that functional network connections, like the information,
credit, labor and land interactions described in this chapter, are strongly in-
ﬂuenced by background variables like geography and family history. In addi-
tion to these underlying social variables, any analysis of transitions requires
data on exogenously changing factors that inﬂuence the costs or beneﬁts of
connections. For example, new market opportunities, new technologies, or
changes in the returns to diﬀerent kinds of assets could provide sources of
variation to provide insight into the creation or collapse of network links.
A key advantage of the Ghana dataset discussed in this chapter is the rel-
ative precision with which it deﬁnes network connections. It is possible, for
example, to distinguish between social interactions that are focused on the
exchange of farming information and those that are associated with credit
or gift exchange. It is plausible that the incentives people face to develop
and maintain these diﬀerent types of connection are diﬀerent, and in fact we
have provided reduced form evidence that they shaped by diﬀerent under-
lying social connections between people. The weakness of data on realized
interactions is that they do not necessarily reveal the potential utility of a
given network link.
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Cambridge University Press, 1994.Table 1: Incidence of Network Connections
Fraction of Pairs of Respondents within Villages with Network Connections
12 3 4 5
Information Links Credit/Gift Links Land Links Labor Links
Village 
Population
Overall 0.015 0.013 0.005 0.006
By Village:
1 0.013 0.011 0.002 0.008 1250
2 0.016 0.015 0.004 0.001 2000
3 0.018 0.012 0.010 0.009 450
4 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.003 1000Table 2: Incidence of Network Connections
Fraction of Pairs of Respondents within Villages with Network Connections
Conditional on the Existence of Alternative Links
Credit Link
Information Link no yes
no n 47860 274
A (row pct) 99.43 0.57
yes n 406 338
(row pct) 54.57 45.43
Pearson chi2(1) =  1.2e+04   Pr = 0.000 
Land Link
Information Link no yes
no n 48034 100
B (row pct) 99.79 0.21
yes n 602 142
(row pct) 80.91 19.09
Pearson chi2(1) =  5.3e+03   Pr = 0.000 
Labor Link
Information Link no yes
no n 48042 92
C (row pct) 99.81 0.19
yes n 556 188
(row pct) 74.73 25.27
Pearson chi2(1) =  8.1e+03   Pr = 0.000 
Land Link
Credit Link no yes
no n 48134 132
D (row pct) 99.73 0.27
yes n 502 110
(row pct) 82.03 17.97
Pearson chi2(1) =  3.8e+03   Pr = 0.000 
Labor Link
Credit Link no yes
no n 48176 90
E (row pct) 99.81 0.19
yes n 422 190
(row pct) 68.95 31.05
Pearson chi2(1) =  1.0e+04   Pr = 0.000 
Land Link
Labor Link no yes
no n 48444 154
F (row pct) 99.68 0.32
yes n 192 88
(row pct) 68.57 31.43
Pearson chi2(1) =  5.5e+03   Pr = 0.000 Table 3: Summary Statistics of Link Characteristics
Variable mean std
At least one of pair holds office 0.22 0.41
Same religion 0.23 0.42
Same matrilineage 0.22 0.42
Same gender 0.52 0.50
Same soil type 0.32 0.47
Absolute value of age difference 10.61 11.61
Absolute value of wealth difference 0.75 1.29
Distance between plots (km) 1.27 0.78
Both members of 1st generation in 
village 0.05 0.21
Families trace origin to same region 0.55 0.50Table 4: Predicting Network Links
Logit Regressions -- Dependent Variable = 1 if Link Exists
12
odds z odds z odds z odds z odds z
At least one of pair holds 
office 1.17 1.26 0.85 -0.78 1.46 1.92 2.30 4.09 2.17 2.62
Same religion 1.06 0.46 1.78 2.92 0.74 -1.19 0.74 -1.19 1.47 1.37
Same matrilineage 1.43 2.93 2.17 3.86 1.36 1.44 1.47 1.85 2.08 2.65
Same gender 7.29 11.57 3.95 5.75 2.54 4.42 3.41 5.56 3.89 4.41
Same soil type 3.09 8.44 1.36 1.55 5.40 6.75 3.39 3.70
Absolute value of age 
difference 1.00 -0.79 1.02 3.43 1.04 7.34 1.04 5.81 1.02 1.86
Absolute value of wealth 
difference 1.23 8.66 0.96 -0.62 1.29 5.22 1.29 6.05 1.08 1.25
Distance between plots 
(km) 0.56 -5.63 0.79 -1.68 0.30 -4.64 0.57 -1.90
Both members of 1st 
generation in village 0.37 -2.37 1.04 0.10 *** **** *** **** 0.78 -0.33
Families trace origin to 
same region 1.09 0.65 2.20 3.22 1.26 1.01 1.31 1.21 1.26 0.75
Predicted probability of 
link mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
if link=1 0.027 0.026 0.005 0.003 0.022 0.033 0.01 0.005 0.006 0.006
if link=1 & less than 5 
years 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
standard errors heteroskedasticity consistent 
n = 40960 
***Both families migrants perfectly predicts no land link
Information Links Credit/Gift Links Land Links Labor Links
34 3B
Land LinksTable 5: Predicting Network Links, with 2-way fixed effects
Logit Regressions -- Dependent Variable = 1 if Link Exists
12
odds z odds z odds z odds z odds z
Same religion 1.38 2.09 2.78 3.67 1.33 0.84 1.22 0.69 2.78 2.59
Same matrilineage 2.10 4.65 1.55 1.34 0.26 -2.60 0.34 -2.31 2.97 2.46
Same gender 6.02 9.15 4.01 5.05 1.89 1.99 1.80 1.89 2.01 1.44
Same soiltype 2.14 3.23 2.23 1.76 11.69 3.33 0.29 -1.35
Absolute value of age 
difference 1.00 -0.19 1.00 -0.34 1.09 4.02 1.07 3.92 1.06 2.02
Absolute value of wealth 
difference 0.87 -1.90 0.93 -0.26 1.19 1.03 1.19 1.16 1.43 1.07
Distance between plots 
(km) 0.35 -9.25 0.55 -3.02 0.13 -8.34 0.31 -4.06
Both members of 1st 
generation in village 2.66 1.73 0.53 -1.12 *** *** *** *** 1.75 0.28
Families trace origin to 
same region 1.98 3.22 1.38 0.63 2.49 1.51 1.09 0.18 9.73 2.82
number of individuals 
dropped
number of observations 
dropped
standard errors heteroskedasticity consistent 
n = 40960 
***Both families migrants perfectly predicts no land link
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